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1. Introduction: Psychological experiments and theoretical accounts of reasoning 
 
Among a number of issues related to the overlap between experimental research  
in psychology and the study of argumentation that have been raised in José Ángel Gascón’s 
insightful paper, two questions seem to be of key importance: (i) what do some psychological 
experiments about giving reasons really tell us about our reasoning? and (ii) how can 
philosophical distinctions between kinds of reasons help us understanding these experiments 
along with their implications for argumentation theory? Gascón’s point of departure is the 
observed gap between how we usually justify our decisions and what the results of 
psychological experiments tell us about our ability to give good reasons. Those experiments 
seem to suggest that people are very bad at pointing to ‘real’ reasons for their actions. In this 
respect, Gascón’s contribution can be interpreted as combining results of research in cognitive 
psychology with the tools of analytical philosophy, specifically with the conceptual framework 
that captures normative, motivating, and explanatory reasons. 
 I am sympathetic to this approach, especially because of the Authors’s clear and 
systematic attempt at finding a proper balance between (i) the experimental research that, by 
collecting empirical material may help us focus on some so far unexplored communication 
phenomena (which should be further informed by the theory of reasoning), and (ii) sketching 
possible research directions for developing theoretical accounts that would be driven by 
empirical research. Keeping in mind that Gascón emphasises that his paper provides the reader 
with just initial answers to questions pointing to that overlap, what I find particularly important 
is the answer to the question of which conclusions drawn from empirical research on giving 
reasons can, to some extent, remodel some basic claims and distinctions in the philosophy of 
argument? In order to outline an answer, in section 2 I will discuss some issues related to one 
of the key distinctions made in the paper, namely the one between reasons and causes. Next,  
in section 3, I will briefly focus on the issue of worries that argumentation theorists may have 
once they have learnt about some results of experiments. This discussion will lead to section  
4, devoted to the issue of the place of argumentation theory within the proposed approach.  
I will sum up in section 5 with an initial attempt at answering the question about a possible 
linkage between the future research on the topic and the replicability problem in behavioural 
sciences.                 
 
2. Reasons and causes for actions   
 
Gascón formulates the main problem of the paper by asking a series of questions that address 
Nisbet and Wilson’s experiments (1977) and their impact on studying reasons: “As a first step, 
however, it would help to be clear about what exactly Nisbett and Wilson’s experiments 
uncovered. Did they identify our real reasons for action? Or did they show us simply the causes 
of our actions? Are they the same thing?” (p. 4). Having formulated this purpose, Gascón 
develops his considerations in a clear and analytical manner, step-by step defining terms and 
identifying issues that help explaining the standard description of the experiment using claims 
and distinctions about the types of reasoning taken from the analytical tradition (e.g. from the 
works of Audi, Davidson and Parfit).  
What may draw readers’ attention in Gascón’s initial description of the experiments 
conducted by Nisbett and Wilson is that causes for our actions seem to be at first glance 
misleadingly associated with reasons for our actions. For example, the stockings experiment  
in which the participants were asked to evaluate four pairs of stockings (which in fact were 
identical) and then to justify their choices (the experiment has shown that the participants were 
likely to choose the pair of stockings situated on the right hand side) Gascón states: “However, 
when the participants were asked about the reasons for their choices, the position of the article 
was never mentioned. In fact, when the researchers suggested that possibility to the participants, 
they denied it” (p. 3). What may strike the reader of this passage is the fact that the participants 
couldn’t point to the reason (associated here to a cause) if they weren’t aware of it. To make 
this point more explicit, the reason I have given in order to justify my action may be different 
from what caused that action. This confusion disappears as it is further shown that the 
explanations of experiments start making more sense once we have distinguished between 
reasons people give with the notion of factors that in fact influence actions. Gascón shows that 
such confusions can be dealt with once the first ones can be in some cases treated as motivating 
reasons, and others – as explanatory ones.  
In other words, Gascón’s work helps us understand that, on the one hand, the 
experiments may tell us something about our dis(ability) to give reasons, especially when we 
don’t have the access to what really influenced our decision, and on the other hand, the very 
description of these experiments seems to be lacking the application of basic types of reasons 
(such as, in this case, our justifications for our actions and the causes of our actions). The clear 
and detailed way in which Gascón identifies these gaps and shows concrete applications of the 
philosophical distinction between the kinds of reasons, is itself a valuable contribution. 
  
3. Should we be worried about the results of psychological experiments?  
 
Gascón makes some general statements about possible worries we can have about the results of 
this kind of experimental research. For example, on p. 2, he asks: “How worried should we be 
by this conclusion?” (in this case about Sperber and Mercier’s statement that humans are 
rationalization machines). The Author builds the whole line of argument around this question 
by stating that the goal of the paper is to give a tentative answer to this question. Gascón seems 
to interpret Nisbet and Wilson’s experiments (1977) as evidence proving that “we lack 
introspective access to the reasons that guide our behaviour” (p. 3). One worrying implication 
for critical thinking theorists could be that if that conclusion is typically true, then it would be 
extremely difficult to train critical thinkers because we could never be sure that the reasons such 
thinkers will be giving will be merely guesses. 
Although I would not say that a result of a certain experiment related to giving reasons 
should be immediately treated as a worry for argumentation scholars, in case of Gascón’s 
contribution this does not seem to affect the results because the experiments are here, as far as 
I can recognise, treated rather as an inspiration to propose a theoretical contribution that 
concerns mostly the applicability of the distinction between the kinds of reasons. As I have 
pointed out in Section 2, the very description of the experiments that mixes up kinds of reasons 
without introducing basic distinctions is a very good reason itself to bring this issue into 
attention in order to show that an argumentation theorist (with the help of some distinctions 
taken from analytical philosophy) is capable of making sense of experimental research. This 
observation may lead us to discussing in a slightly greater detail the question about what is the 
place of argumentation theory within this approach.           
 
4. And Where’s Argumentation Theory?    
 
As the challenge for argumentation theory would be to answer the question of how the existing 
taxonomies of reasons relate to what cognitive psychology has to offer in terms of conclusions 
drawn from some key experiments. Do they reveal anything new about the nature of reasoning 
that should make the argumentation scholars adjust their taxonomies of reasoning? Gascón’s 
paper clearly seeks for the balanced approach that would be both theoretically informed by 
analytical philosophy and empirically driven by the results of experimental research. However, 
in line with Section 2, an issue could be here raised about the gap between our declared reasons 
and the genuine causes for our choices ruled by the principles of social influence (e.g., Cialdini, 
2001). Let us consider, as an example, the rule of consequence, according to which I would 
follow the commitment I have made in the past and I would try to rationalise this objectively 
bad decision  by giving some other reasons. I  agree with Gascón that the distinction between 
motivating reasons (here: being consequent because I think that acting consequently is a value 
in the social interaction with others) and the explanatory reasons (here: the psychological 
mechanism of consequence bases on the rule of influence I am not fully aware of). But how 
could this explication on my ‘consequent’ behaviour affect argumentation studies? In other 
words: in which way, and to which extent, the fact learnt from empirical research in psychology 
that we sometimes neglect real reasons for our actions should have impact on a theoretical 
account of giving reasons in argumentation research? 
Despite a detailed discussion of problems arising from the experimental research, what 
I believe has not been made explicit in the paper are the detailed conclusions for argumentation 
theory such as those related to answering questions like: given this particular result of the 
experiment, do argumentation theorists have to change their conceptual framework? Hence,  
I think that what could be made more explicit in the future inquiry is indicating how exactly the 
conclusions drawn from experimental studies tell us about redefining (if necessary) some 
particular tasks of argument analysts and evaluators. As Gascón is well aware of the fact that 
he has just outlined some initial answers, this work, by ‘translating’ the results of psychological 
experiments into the language of the philosophy of argument and reasoning, is a valuable source 
of inspiration for providing argumentation scholars with a detailed instruction about how  
to apply the existing distinctions in philosophy of reasoning to analytically approach the 
empirical data. 
 
5. Methodological issues in experimental psychology and the empirical evidence for giving 
reasons   
 
Let me indicate yet another research perspective with posing a general question which is related 
to the idea of treating experimental research in cognitive psychology as an inspiration for 
developing some areas of argumentation theory. The discussions about the ‘replication crisis’ 
in experimental social psychology and computational neuroscience (see. e.g. Hüffmeier et. al, 
2016; Miłkowski et. al. 2018), along with other disciplines, thanks to the critical assessment of 
reproducibility, have revealed some key methodological issues related to experimental 
research. Although I do not think that the replication problem is the main concern from the 
point of view of this paper, the following question about the general line of the future inquiry 
into kinds of reasons may here arise: would such issues as the replication crisis affect the 
research direction Gascón is proposing? If, for instance, it would be difficult to replicate the 
results of a given experiment about giving reasons, would that make us to hold on with drawing 
conclusions that could be crucial for the philosophical theories of reasoning and argumentation 
studies until the results are replicated?  
If I correctly understood the core of Gascón’s contribution, the fact of whether or not 
results of a particular experiment would be replicable is, at least at this stage of inquiry, less 
important than giving an answer to the question: to what extent may the experiments inspire 
argumentation theorists to incorporate their analytic conceptual framework for capturing 
possible implications for the study of reasoning and thus to focus on some unexplored 
theoretical issues? My view is that the first necessary step made in the direction initiated by 
Gascón would be to collect most urgent issues that could serve as a valuable source of 
inspiration for developing a more robust theoretically informed and empirically driven 
taxonomy of kinds of reasons.        
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